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REFRAMING AND REFORMING THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: LESSONS FROM LITERATURE
ON CHANGE LEADERSHIP
JoAN MAcLEOD HEMINWAY*
IT is a time of change at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Faith in the SEC's power to regulate has been low.' In the past
two years, federal regulators, legal scholars, and other expert commenta-
tors have proposed various substantive restructurings of and improve-
ments to the SEC. Serious proposals have ranged from combining the
authority of the SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
to expanding or revamping SEC enforcement authority, policies, or proce-
dures.2 Notwithstanding some commentary to the contrary,3 change at
the SEC has begun and is likely to continue.
Whether certain kinds of change (actual and proposed) are needed,
whether SEC officials and other governmental leaders are ready for mean-
ingful change, and whether actual or proposed change efforts will meet
desired objectives are important unanswered (and perhaps unanswerable)
questions. Even though the SEC has successfully renewed itself in the
* College of Law Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee
College of Law; A.B. 1982, Brown University; J.D. 1985, New York University School
of Law. The published version of this Article benefited from the comments of
fellow presenters and audience members from the 2009 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
Symposium on Securities Regulation, Financial Regulatory Reform: Genesis,
Progress, and Impact, at the Villanova University School of Law, including
especially Harvey Goldschmid and Arthur Laby. I also am grateful for summer
funding from The University of Tennessee College of Law that enabled me to
research and submit the proposal for this Article and also for the able help
provided by my research assistant, Jonathan Edwards.
1. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning The SEC: Does the Trea-
sury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 713 (2009) ("If the rest of the world
once looked to the SEC for leadership on issues of securities regulation, the SEC's
presumed leadership is very much in question today.").
2. See, e.g., Financial Regulatory Reform: The SEC Enforcement Perspective, E-ALERT
(Covington & Burling LLP, Wash., D.C.), June 19, 2009, http://www.cov.com/
files/Publication/b645f64c-b4b3-4b20-94d8-128600de9a3d/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/b3c4184e-949b-4bd4-b395-12cef3ble84c/Financial%20
Regulatory%20Reform%20-%2OThe%20SEC%2OEnforcement%2OPerspective.
pdf; Ronald D. Orol, SEC Chief It Is Logical to Combine the SEC and CFTC,
MARKETWATCH, June 2, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-chief-its-
logical-to-combine-sec-and-cftc; Edgar Ortega & Alison Vekshin, U.S. Should Still
Pursue SEC-CFTC Combination, NYSE CEO Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, June 11, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aVJHnsABbsaA; Post-
ing of Thomas 0. Gorman to SEC Actions, http://www.secactions.com/?p=871
(Mar. 2, 2009, 03:34 EST).
3. See, e.g., David Weidner, Dream of SEC Overhaul Fades Along with Crisis, WALL
ST. J., May 7, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124163629277392
725.htmh.
(627)
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past,4 we have reason to fear unpreparedness and failure in the current
environment. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act-our most recent significant re-
form measure in the realm of securities regulation-was unsophisticated,
piecemeal, reactive, crisis-based, limited-impact, politically motivated legis-
lation.5 The included reforms may have fixed certain discrete problems
identified in the corporate fiascos that consumed the first few years of the
new millennium, but the changes made did not protect investors and mar-
ket integrity in a sustained or coherent fashion.6 In fact, as many have
observed, the regulatory changes included in and adopted by the SEC
under Sarbanes-Oxley arose less from prudent, thoughtful management
and leadership than from a panicked desire to quickly offset negative pub-
lic reaction to a perceived market crisis.7 Moreover, "[b]usiness experi-
4. SeeJOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 290-348, 688-714
(3d ed. 2003) (describing reforms in market structure during the SEC Chairman-
ships of William Cary and Arthur Levitt).
5. See Will it Fly?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 5, 2008 (noting consonant comments of
Professors Hal Scott and Frank Partnoy).
6. See, e.g., Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons From a Perfect
Storm of Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL.
W. L. REv. 163, 242-43 (2003) ("Additional signatures, additional jail sentences,
additional oversight Boards, and additional rules for Boards are the types of
changes that seem logical, punitive and satisfying for an investor class hungry for
the restoration of trust. However, ... it is not clear that they address the root cause
of the problems that gave rise to Enron's perfect storm, a storm that has now
found its way into the bellies of other companies."); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs.
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28J.
CORP. L. 1, 2 (2002) (favoring market-based reform over the regulatory changes
imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Mak-
ing of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) ("In the frantic
political environment in which SOX was enacted, legislators adopted proposals of
policy entrepreneurs with neither careful consideration nor assimilation of the
literature at odds with the policy prescriptions.").
7. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics:
Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FoRDIIAM L. REv. 1615, 1624 (2006)
("[C]onsider the many prophylactic requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which are widely seen as a knee-jerk political reaction disproportionate to the se-
verity of the underlying problems, costing shareholders (the primary intended
beneficiaries) far more than any benefits it might generate."); Jonathan Macey,
Executive Branch Usurpation of Power: Corporations and Capital Markets, 115 YALE L.J.
2416, 2437 (2006) ("Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in a panicked frenzy as Congress
and the President attempted to quell the public outrage over Enron and perhaps
even to gain some measure of political advantage from the scandals."); Romano,
supra note 6, at 1523 ("SOX was enacted in a flurry of congressional activity in the
runup to the midterm 2002 congressional elections after the spectacular failures of
the once highly regarded firms Enron and WorldCom."); Cheryl L. Wade, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Ethical Corporate Climates: What the Media Reports; What the Gen-
eral Public Knows, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 421, 440 (2008) ("Business
leaders complain that SOX was hastily enacted and that its benefits are severely
outweighed by its costs . . . ."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in
Haste, Repenting in Leisure 2 (UCLA Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No.
06-14, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=899593 ("Congress was in too
much of a hurry for very much in the way of serious cost-benefit analysis. Instead,
they threw a bunch of ideas into a single basket and rushed it into law so that angry
[Vol. 55: p. 627628
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ence indicates that about two-thirds of all organizational change efforts
fail to meet their goals."8 Current proposals for SEC reform constitute or
involve organizational change, and there is no reason to believe that orga-
nizational change efforts affecting the SEC will be more successful than
those undertaken in the non-governmental business world.
In fact, there are strong parallels between independent agencies (of
which the SEC is one example) 9 and business corporations.1 0 Both are, at
their structural core, bureaucracies-organizations with similar manage-
ment hierarchies built on trust relationships between the beneficiaries of
their operations and those who manage and conduct those operations.'
Both agencies and firms "use authority to organize the decisional environ-
ments of their members and to reduce transaction costs," 12 and both "also
face internal transaction costs" arising "from each organization's need to
delegate decision-making within its ranks."1 3 Further, both are boundedly
rational in their decision-making. 14
investors would blame somebody-anybody-other than Congress for the stock
market bubble's bursting and the corporate governance scandals.").
8. Lee G. Bolman & Terry E. Deal, 4 Steps to Keeping Change Efforts Heading in
the Right Direction, J. FOR QUALIY & PARTICIPATION, May/June 1999, at 7. Similarly,
CEOs surveyed in the 1990s "reported that up to 75% of their organizational
change efforts did not yield the promised results." Myron Rogers & Margaret J.
Wheatley, Bringing Life to Organizational Change, in FINDING OUR WAY: LEADERSHIP
FOR AN UNCERTAIN TIME 83, 83 (Margaret J. Wheatley ed., 2005).
9. See Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies: Government's Scourge or Salvation?,
1988 DUKE L.J. 286, 286-88. Independent federal agencies are part of the "Fourth
Branch" of the federal government. See id. at 286. They are not exclusively con-
trolled by the executive branch or legislative branch, but rather are beholden to
some extent to each and also subject to the will of the judicial branch. See id. at
286-88. Moreover, they may have executive, legislative, and judicial responsibili-
ties. See id. at 286.
10. See William G. Childs, When Criminal and Tort Law Incentives Run into Tight
Budgets and Regulatory Discretion, 34 CAP. U. L. REv. 581, 594 n.53 (2006) (noting
that "[a] Westlaw search for 'like a business' in the same sentence as 'government'
or 'agency' in the last two years returned 514 documents in the ALLNEWS
database."); Molly Elizabeth Hall, Pollution Havens? A Look at Environmental Permit-
ting in the United States and Germany, 7 Wis. ENVrL. L.J. 1, 31 (2000) ("Like Ameri-
can business and commercial institutions, government agencies practice a user-
friendly approach toward everyone that calls or comes into the office, be they po-
tential investors, state residents, or members of an environmental group.").
11. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1276 (1983) (describing these parallels and identifying four models,
based in legal scholarship, that describe and justify both agency bureaucracies and
corporate bureaucracies).
12. Eric T. Laity, The Corporation as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures and
Institutional Design, 28 VA. TAX REv. 411, 448 (2008).
13. Id. at 450.
14. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REv. 525, 537-38 (1997) (suggesting that
both agencies and corporations engage in "techno-bureaucratic rationality" in
their decision-making); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a World of
Techno-Bureaucratic Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEx. L. REv. 559,
559 (1997).
2010] 629
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Of course, there also are notable differences between governmental
administrative organizations and private firms. "Firms can better gather
information about demand because they are close to customer prefer-
ences by financial necessity. If firms in competitive markets fail to satisfy
customer preferences, they will go bankrupt. Government agencies, on
the other hand, cannot be forced into bankruptcy and dissolved by their
creditors."1 5 Moreover, constraints on managers may differ in federal
agencies and non-governmental corporations.
Managers of government agencies have far less control over their
organizations' activities than their counterparts in private firms
since the goals of public agencies are often established by entities
outside the organization, such as legislative bodies, courts, inter-
est groups and other government agencies. Private corporations
may also be influenced by outside entities, but to a lesser degree
than public agencies. Furthermore, unlike their counterparts in
private businesses, public managers have little flexibility to alter
their organizations' production inputs such as wages.1 6
In addition, although both agency decision-makers and corporate deci-
sion-makers enjoy judicial deference, the level of deference may differ
(with agency decision-making sometimes subject to a "hard look," a
greater level of scrutiny than the presumptions of the business judgment
rule allow in the review of disinterested board decision-making in the cor-
porate context).17
Yet, despite these differences (and because of the bureaucratic and
agency-related similarities) between governmental agencies and corpora-
tions, business scholarship, especially the growing literature on manage-
ment and leadership in times of change (referred to in this Article as
"change leadership" literature), offers a number of potentially valuable
lenses through which we may assess the SEC's readiness for change, iden-
tify and address organizational change issues relevant to current (and fu-
ture) SEC reform proposals, and support the efforts of related change
managers. A variety of germane questions may be derived from hypothe-
ses and theories represented in change leadership literature.
* Do the relevant change leaders have the characteristics necessary to
exercise effective change leadership? Leaders in times of change
15. Laity, supra note 12, at 449.
16. Joseph W. Belluck, Comment, Increasing Citizen Participation in US. Postal
Service Policy Making: A Model Act to Create a Post Office Consumer Action Group, 42
Burr. L. Rrv. 253, 261 (1994).
17. See McGarity, supra note 14, at 525-28 (analogizing judicial review of an
artificially constructed corporate decision-making process to judicial review of
agency decision-making as means of exploring undesirability of "hard look" stan-
dard for judicial review of federal agency rulemaking).
630 [Vol. 55: p. 627
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may require different attributes and skills than those who manage
in less turbulent times.18
* Is our national leadership employing processes that are known to
be likely to create successful organizational change? Leaders effec-
tuating reform at the SEC do not have to create a method for
change leadership out of whole cloth.1 9
* In assessing possible visions, strategies, and solutions, and in estab-
lishing processes for making desired changes, are change leaders
operating mechanistically or dynamically? Organizations tend to
behave organically, and change may be more successful if leaders
acknowledge this.20
* Are our national leaders and other change agents taking into ac-
count varied views of how organizations work (i.e., human re-
sources needs, structural considerations, political conflicts, and the
role of symbols) in approaching the process for reforming the SEC?
Leaders who fail to engage and consider different perspectives are
less likely to meet with success in organizational change efforts.2 1
With the thought that securities regulators and others may learn valu-
able lessons about the SEC's restructuring and reorganization from ex-
perts in change leadership, this Article explores this selected group of
questions by setting forth the answers in the form of lessons from the re-
lated literature. These lessons may then be viewed through the lens of the
current SEC reform environment. The resulting analysis offers certain
positive observations but also allows for certain critiques of, questions
about, and advice concerning the processes by which change leaders are
selected and reform is undertaken. As a result, the Article highlights cer-
tain strengths of and exposes possible weaknesses in current and proposed
SEC reform efforts.
To accomplish its purposes, the Article begins by summarizing in Part
I the key reform proposals emanating from the global financial crisis and
reform efforts being undertaken as of the spring of 2010, when work on
this Article was completed. While one may question the wisdom of some
or all of the proposed reforms to the SEC's structure and operations, this
Article does not focus on the merits of the various proposals. Rather, it
focuses on the prospects for successful change once reform proposals are
adopted and implemented. Accordingly, in Part II, the Article sets forth
four change leadership lessons (derived from the relevant literature) that
have bearing on the implementation of SEC reforms and evaluates ex-
isting SEC leadership and reform efforts in light of the lessons. A brief
conclusion follows in Part III.
18. See infta Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See infra Part II.D.
6312010]
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I. CuRRENT SEC ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM PROPOSALS AND EFFORTS
"Regulatory bodies, like the people who guide them have a marked
life cycle. In their youth they are vigorous, aggressive, evangelistic and
even intolerant. Later they mellow, and in old age-in a matter of 10 or
15 years-they become, with some exceptions either an arm of the indus-
try they are regulating or senile."2 2
One does not have to agree that the SEC was over-the-hill as many as
sixty years ago in order to acknowledge that public disclosures of signifi-
cant instances of corporate and individual securities fraud and revelations
of other perceived or actual regulatory failures after the turn of the cen-
tury exposed certain apparent weaknesses in the structure and operation
of the SEC as a regulatory organization. The exposure of these apparent
weaknesses has fostered the identification and proposal of various struc-
tural and operational changes by political figures and academics alike.
Some of these proposals already are being implemented. This part identi-
fies and describes key reform proposals and efforts.
A. Structural Reform Proposals
Since the March 2008 release by the U.S. Department of the Treasury
of its Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, proposing sig-
nificant consolidation of financial regulation (the "Treasury Blueprint"), 23
there have been many further suggestions for financial regulatory reform
at the federal level. A number of proposals would eliminate or alter the
SEC's role in U.S. financial regulation. Three of these reforms are briefly
described below.
1. Overhaul or Abolish the SEC
Although no one seems too serious about this option, there have
been calls to wholly revamp or dismantle the SEC and create a new agency
or spread the SEC's useful functions among other government agencies. 24
After all, the functions of the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933 origi-
nally were vested in the Federal Trade Commission;2 5 the SEC was formed
22. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 171 (2d ed. 1961).
23. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRucTURE (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY BLUEPRINT].
24. See, e.g., CHARLES GASPARINO, THE SELLOUT (2009); Robert Schmidt &
Jesse Westbrook, U.S. May Strip SEC of Powers in Regulatory Overhaul, BLOOMBERG.
com, May 20, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
al8ctNv3FDcw; Alan Schram, Abolish the SEC, THE HUFFINGTON PosT, Dec. 22,
2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-schram/abolish-the-sec_b_152748.
html; Paul Tharp & Mark Decambre, Cox And Levitt Trade Barbs Over Fighting
Frauds, N.Y. PosT, Dec. 18, 2008, at 42; Weidner, supra note 3; Alexandra Zendrian,
Letters to the SEC, FORBES, July 15, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/15/
securities-exchange-commission-intelligent-investing-regulation.html.
25. See SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 70-71.
632 [Vol. 55: p. 627
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under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.26 The plan for reform pub-
lished by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in June 2009 (the "Obama
Reform Plan") does not endorse the overhaul or abolition of the SEC,2 7
and neither the financial regulation reform bill passed by the U.S. House
of Representatives in December 2009 (the "House Reform Bill") nor the
Senate financial reform bill passed in May 2010 (the "Senate Reform Bill")
includes a provision to that effect.2 8
2. Manage the SEC through the Federal Reserve or the Department of the
Treasury
As the full extent of the financial crisis unfolded in 2008, public re-
ports suggested the SEC might remain extant but be monitored or man-
aged in whole or in part by another, ostensibly more responsible,
agency.29 The other agencies mentioned include the Federal Reserve and
the Department of the Treasury. To some, this approach seems absurd
because all three regulators can be held responsible for failing to recog-
nize and capitalize on opportunities to spot and stem the tide of various
elements of the recent financial crisis. 30 Yet, the idea is borne of a regula-
tory overlap-here, the overlapping regulation of financial services issu-
ers-that begs for rationalization.3 1 Still, there are many things the SEC
does, including principally disclosure regulation and enforcement, that
are not within the noted expertise of either the Federal Reserve or the
Department of the Treasury.3 2 It does not make sense to have either of
these non-expert regulatory bodies govern the whole of the SEC. None of
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (2006).
27. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANcIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANcIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 4 (2009) [here-
inafter OBAMA REFORM PLAN], available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/
regs/FinalReportweb.pdf ("The Securities and Exchange Commission ... would
maintain . .. current responsibilities and authorities . . . ."); see also Sara Hansard,
SEC Doesn't Need a Defibrillator After All; Administration Would Give It More Clout, Boost
Funding by 7%, INVESTMENT NEWS, June 29, 2009, at 3.
28. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname= 11cong.bills&docid=f:h4173eh.txt.pdf; see also Restoring
American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_fies/HR_4173_Senate-passed as_
amended.pdf.
29. See Matt Kelly, As Priorities Shift, XBRL Loses Spotlight at SEC, DATA INTERAc-
TrIVE, June 1, 2009, http://hitachidatainteractive.com/2009/06/01/as-priorities-
shift-xbrl-loses-spotlight-at-sec/; Schmidt & Westbrook, supra note 24; see also Weid-
ner, supra note 3.
30. See Sudeep Reddy, Congress Weighs Scope of Fed's Authority, WALL ST. J., Oct.
28, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125677301319414567.html.
31. In fact, the Treasury Blueprint called for a formalization of existing coop-
eration practices that operate in areas of regulatory overlap. See TREASURY
BLUEPRINT, supra note 23, at 85.
32. Cf Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 775-79 (summarizing areas of relative
expertise of the Federal Reserve and the SEC).
2010] 633
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the extant reform proposals-the Obama Reform Plan, the House Reform
Bill, and the Senate Reform Bill-provides for SEC supervision by another
regulatory body, although the Obama Reform Plan does call for the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, rather than the SEC, to engage in consolidated super-
vision and regulation of certain investment banks and other large,
leveraged, interconnected financial firms (known as Tier 1 FHCs).3 3
3. Combine the SEC with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
The Treasury Blueprint proposed a consolidation of the SEC and
CFTC into a single regulatory agency.3 4 The report argued that
"[p]roduct and market participant convergence, market linkages, and
globalization have rendered regulatory bifurcation of the futures and se-
curities markets untenable, potentially harmful, and inefficient" and
called for the SEC to modernize certain aspects of its operations to make a
fusion of the SEC and CFTC "more seamless."3 5 Although the Obama
Reform Plan does not mandate a combination of the two agencies, it does
call for regulatory harmonization as a precursor to possible merger.3 6 The
initial steps in this harmonization can be accomplished without congres-
sional action. Further, both the House Reform Bill and the Senate Re-
form Bill include provisions calling for collaboration or consultation
between the SEC and CFTC.3 7
B. Operational Reform Proposals and Initiatives
Many organizational reform proposals emanating from the financial
crisis fall short of structural changes in securities regulation. Instead,
these proposals have called for modifications to the policies or procedures
of the SEC or its individual operating units. Post-crisis suggestions for and
implementation of operational changes have ranged from the Obama Re-
form Plan's harmonization of the regulatory operations of the SEC and
CFTC,3 8 through the types of collaboration and consultation represented
in the House Reform Bill and the Senate Reform Bill3 9 and targeted en-
hancements in SEC personnel coincident with and following the establish-
ment of the Obama administration, 40 to the reorganization of the Division
33. See OBAMA REFORM PLAN, supra note 27, at 10, 12, 36-37.
34. See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 23, at 11 ("[T]he CFTC and the SEC
should be merged to provide unified oversight and regulation of the futures and
securities industries."); id. at 115-16 (discussing merger).
35. Id. at 11-12.
36. See OBAMA REFoRM PLAN, supra note 27, at 4, 49-51.
37. See sources cited supra note 28.
38. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
40. In addition to the appointment of a new SEC Chair and a new Director of
the Division of Enforcement, the SEC has recruited and hired specialized staff,
including most recently new unit heads. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs and Head of New Office of
634 [Vol. 55: p. 627
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of Enforcement and additional training for its staff.4 1 Although action on
some proposals has been delayed or derailed, a number of these proposals
are being implemented or have the prospect of being implemented in the
near future.4 2 A list of ongoing SEC reform efforts can be found on the
SEC's Web site.4 3
These reforms reach into many aspects of the SEC's operations, but
most prevalently touch the operations of the Division of Enforcement and
its Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations. The Division of
Enforcement has been under especially close scrutiny in the twenty-first
century in the wake of revelations of financial fraud at Enron Corporation,
WorldCom, Inc., and other public company issuers.4 4 Most recently, the
Division was criticized for failing to earlier recognize the financial peril in
which investment banks found themselves and to earlier identify and shut
down the massive Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard Madoff and the
securities fraud committed by R. Allen Stanford.45 The Madoff affair
prompted a detailed investigation and report from the Office of the In-
spector General of the SEC (OIG), 4 6 together with a related set of recom-
mendations. 47  The OIG's twenty-one recommendations include
suggestions for improvements in: the handling of tips and complaints; staff
training; periodic policy and procedure reviews; and specific operating
procedures relating to, among other things, staff communications, re-
Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2010/2010-5.htm.
41. See The SEC's Failure to Identify the Bernard L. MadoffPonzi Scheme and How to
Improve SEC Performance: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, House, and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of
Enforcement, and John Walsh, Acting Director, Office of Compliance Inspections
and Examinations) [hereinafter Madoff Failure Testimony], available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/tsO9lOO9rk-jw.htm; Kevin McCoy, SEC Investigations
to get tougher; Madoff debacle prompts many recommendations, USA TODAY, Sept. 11,
2009, at 3B; see also infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
42. See Fawn Johnson, Group Alleges Slack SEC Response To Internal Watchdog,
NASDAQ, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-story.
aspx?storyid=200912171553dowjonesdjonlineoo0580&title=group-alleges-slack-sec-
response-to-intemal-watchdog; Jesse Westbrook, Wall Street Waits as SEC Fails to
Bring Madoff-Inspired Reforms, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 30, 2009, http://www.bloom
berg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=afUov5lEmwc.
43. See The Securities and Exchange Commission: Post-Madoff Reforms (Dec.
7, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm.
44. See Editorial, Of Madoff Stanford and SEC, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2009, avail-
able at http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2009/02/of-madoff-stanf.html.
45. See id.; Stephen Labaton, S.E. C. Chief Pursues Reversal of Years of Lax Enforce-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, at BI.
46. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REVIEW
AND ANALYSIS OF OCIE EXAMINATIONS OF BERNARD L. MADoFF INVESTMENT SECURI-
TIES, LLC (2009), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/
2009/468.pdf.
47. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PROGRAM
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED WITHIN THE SEC's DIVIsION OF ENFORCEMENT (2009), avail-
able at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/ 2 00 9/ 4 6 7 .pdf.
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source allocation, information validation and documentation. 8 In addi-
tion, the OIG recommends that the Division of Enforcement (1) further
analyze staff concerns about the "communication of program priorities,"
"case handling procedures," and internal "working relationships" and (2)
identify and propose responsive improvements. 49
II. FOUR IMPORTANT LESSONS FROM CHANGE LEADERSHIP LITERATuRE
AND THEIR APPLICATION TO CuRREr SEC REFORM
PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES
The summary of proposed reforms in Part I illustrates the intense
scrutiny that the SEC has been under in the past few years. With the elec-
tion of Barack Obama as the forty-fourth President of the United States
came a change in leadership at the SEC. Mary Schapiro was sworn into
office as the twenty-ninth Chairman of the SEC on January 27, 2009.50
Leading change is a tricky business. Given that success in organiza-
tional change is a low-probability proposition,5 ' business scholars have ob-
served, theorized, and tested certain aspects of organizational change to
try to determine predictors of success or failure. This part summarizes
four lessons from the resulting change leadership literature and applies
them to current SEC reform proposals and efforts.
A. It Is Important that Organizations Select the Right Change Leaders to
Best Ensure Success in Organizational Change
A person is a leader because he or she engenders followers. 5 2 A per-
son follows a leader based on emotion.5 3 Leaders convincingly communi-
cate a positive message that counteracts a negative feeling in a community
or other population; "[t]hey are people whom others perceive as being
able to make things better. . . . Ultimately, leaders lead because they cre-
ate a passionate commitment in other people to pursue the leader's strat-
egy and succeed."54
Effective change requires leadership.
Managing change is important.. . . But for most organizations,
the much bigger challenge is leading change. Only leadership
can blast through the many sources of . .. inertia. Only leader-
ship can motivate the actions needed to alter behavior in any sig-
48. See id. at iii-v, 3-19.
49. Id. at vi, 19-27.
50. See SEC Biography: Chairman Mary L. Schapiro (Feb. 23, 2009), http://
www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/schapiro.htm.
51. For discussion of success in organizational change, see supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
52. See Judith M. Bardwick, Peacetime Management and Wartime Leadership, in
THE LEADER OF THE FuTURE 131, 138-39 (Frances Hesselbein et al. eds., 1996).
53. See id.
54. Id. at 139.
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nificant way. Only leadership can get change to stick by
anchoring it in the very culture of an organization.5 5
Accordingly, a threshold matter in organizational change efforts is the
identity of the change leader.
It is important to observe at the outset that we choose SEC commis-
sioners, unit leaders, and staff (as well as other related elected and ap-
pointed officials who may be involved in leading and implementing SEC
reform efforts) the same way, regardless of the social, economic, and polit-
ical climate in which they will work. Yet, leaders in times of change may
require different attributes and skills than those who manage in less turbu-
lent times. This means that those engaged in the standard SEC leadership
identification and selection process during a crisis of confidence should
be sensitive to the need for a specialized type of leader-a change
leader-as a means of restoring confidence.
But who are these change leaders? What characteristics do they ex-
hibit? Change leadership literature tells us that we should be looking for
"wartime leaders"-"people who embrace major change because they see
far more opportunity than threat in turbulence" 56-and "problem-find-
ers"-individuals who "not only exhibit a curious mindset, but . . . also
embrace systemic thinking."57 It is my hope that this Article will help fo-
cus the President, Congress, and high-ranking SEC officials on factors im-
portant to leadership choices in times of change.
In her work Peacetime Management and Wartime Leadership, manage-
ment consultant Judith Bardwick observes that times of peace rarely re-
quire more than management of incremental change, but times of war-
periods of significant disorder fraught with urgent and emergent events
and circumstances-require leadership. Bardwick suggests that "peace-
time management" is appropriate during an era of organizational predict-
ability, where things continue along the same trajectory.58 But "wartime
leadership" is needed during times of change. Among other things, war-
time leaders "get the organization to focus and to become involved only in
what matters the most."5 9 In addition, wartime leaders: "create a winning
strategy" by focusing on what the organization can do to ensure customer
loyalty; "communicate persuasively" using focused, targeted messages; "be-
have with integrity"; "respect others" by seeking their input, encouraging
55. JOHN P. KoTrrER, LEADING CHANGE 30 (1996).
56. Bardwick, supra note 52, at 131-39 (defining wartime leaders as "people
who embrace major change because they see far more opportunity than threat in
turbulence" and describing six things that they must do to achieve success).
57. MICHAEL A. ROBERTO, KNow WHAT You DON'T KNow: How GREAT LEAD-
ERS PREVENT PROBLEMS BEFORE THEY HAPPEN 191 (2009); see also The Mindset of a
Problem-Finder, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, July 15, 2009, http://knowledge.wharton.
upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2285 (reviewing KNow WHAT You DON'T KNOW,
supra).
58. See Bardwick, supra note 52, at 132.
59. Id. at 134.
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debate, and demanding alignment with the resulting decisions; and take
action to show decisiveness and strength as a means of inspiring confi-
dence in organizational constituents. 0 Among these attributes, persua-
sive communication seems to be a key factor that both reflects and creates
the trust that bonds the leader to his or her followers.
People trust others when they are told that something will hap-
pen and it does. Major change, therefore, always threatens trust
and thus, ultimately, confidence in leadership. Ineffective or
non-existent communication results in an enormous increase in
mistrust, confusion, and cynicism and huge decline in morale,
belief in the organization, and confidence in leadership. That's
why the need for persuasive communication is especially critical
in periods of major threat or change.6 1
Are SEC Chairman6 2 Mary Schapiro and Division of Enforcement Di-
rector Robert Khuzami "wartime leaders"? While it may be too early to
tell, both have exhibited characteristics of wartime leaders.6 3 Both moved
quickly to identify focused reform initiatives and begin implementing
changes that addressed the existing lack of public confidence in the SEC,
both have prioritized the implementation of reform proposals and fo-
cused the organization around those priorities, and both have shown per-
suasive communication skills.6 4 The SEC leadership has conducted a self-
assessment of the Division of Enforcement as part of its reform strategy,
and Director Khuzami has revisited the effects of the resulting decisions
with the Division's employees.6 5 Current indications therefore support
60. Id. at 134-38.
61. Id. at 136.
62. My use of the word "Chairman" in this Article to describe the female
leader of the SEC is purposeful, even if uncomfortable. The SEC's Web site identi-
fies Mary Schapiro as the SEC Chairman. I hope that our federal government will
consider adopting gender-neutral ("Chair")-or at least gender-accurate ("Chair-
woman") -descriptors for its leadership.
63. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Jenna Greene, New Enforcement Chief Aims to Restore Confidence in
SEC, NAT'L LAw J., Oct. 20, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1202434751457; Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at AICPA National Conference on Current SEC
and PCAOB Developments (Dec. 8, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/2009/spchl2O8O9rsk.htm) [hereinafter Khuzami, AICPA Re-
marks]; Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Alan B. Leven-
son Keynote Address at the 37th Annual Securities Regulation Institute:
Embracing the Change (Jan. 20, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/2010/spchO12010mls.htm) [hereinafter Schapiro, Embracing
Change]; Stephen Taub, Mary Schapiro Puts SEC Back in Business, INsTrrTUrONAL
INVESTOR, Nov. 2009, http://www.iimagazine.com/article.aspx?articlelD=2333948;
Rachelle Younglai, SEC Chief Says Agency to Act Like "Hair's on Fire," REuTERs, Feb. 6,2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51548J20090206; Rachelle Youn-
glai, SEC's Tough New Cop Seen HelpingAgency's Image, REUTERs, Apr. 10, 2009, http:/
/www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5392JU20090410.
65. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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the conclusion that both Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami are
wartime leaders.
Wartime leadership may be a necessary but insufficient condition to
accomplishing effective change leadership, however. Recent change lead-
ership literature also points to the value of "problem-finders" in success-
fully leading an organization through tough times with integrity. Effective
problem-finders engage questions and criticism; they pursue potential is-
sues with deeper analysis to isolate trouble early on.
[L]eaders need to become hunters who venture out in search of
the problems that might lead to disaster for their firms. They
cannot wait for the problems to come to them. Time becomes
the critical factor. The sooner leaders can identify and surface
problems, the more likely they can prevent a major catastrophe.
If leaders spot the threats early, they have more time to take cor-
rective action. They can interrupt a chain of events before it spi-
rals out of control. 66
Successful problem-finders exhibit seven behavioral characteristics.67
Specifically, they: (1) circumvent gatekeepers by going directly to the
source for information; (2) act as ethnographers by observing how rele-
vant populations (employees, customers, suppliers) actually behave; (3)
hunt for patterns, including parallels to events from the past; (4) connect
the dots, integrating "critical data and knowledge"; (5) encourage useful
failures to promote risk-taking and reduce the fear of failure; (6) train
employees in effective, appropriate communication-that is, "how to talk
and listen"; and (7) reflect systematically on the organization and its
competitors. 68
Problem-finding seems to have been in short supply at the SEC in
recent years. In theory, with problem-finders as leaders, the SEC could
have sooner identified major problems such as the financial shenanigans
at Enron and WorldCom, the precarious financial state of U.S. investment
banks in 2007-2008, and the fraudulent activities of Bernard Madoff, R.
Allen Stanford, and others. Knowledgeable commentators have noted the
need for the SEC to become more nimble at problem-finding. 69 SEC lead-
ers who are problem-finders have the capacity to better ensure the dual
fundamental policy objectives under the federal securities laws: investor
protection and market integrity maintenance.
66. ROBERTO, supra note 57, at xviii.
67. See id. at 19-20 (summarizing these behaviors, which are covered in detail
in the remainder of the book).
68. Id.
69. SeeJonathan Stempel & Rachelle Younglai, SEC Checklist: Fix the Mess, Find
the Next Madoff REuTERs, Sept. 4, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE
5834AC20090905 (noting comments from former SEC Branch Chief Michael Mac-
Phail and former SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid to that effect).
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So, are our new SEC leaders "problem-finders"? This is a difficult
question to answer in the absence of detailed information about how
Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami operate in their day-to-day en-
gagements with peers and staff. Observations are mixed. At the time of
her appointment over a year ago, a commentator said the following about
Chairman Schapiro:
Do I think that she has the personality and the chops to take on
that assignment? Candidly, I just don't know. A lot of what she
did at NASD/FINRA is commendable, but not everything; and I
can speak with personal knowledge that she failed to recognize
the size and conviction of the dissident/reform movement within
the indie/regional broker-dealer community.7 0
Moreover, early reforms she initiated at the SEC that put more power and
discretion in the hands of SEC staff did not engender confidence that she
was increasing the staff's capacity for problem-finding.7 1 On the other
hand, in an October 2009 speech, Chairman Schapiro noted reforms in
her first nine months in office that appear to emanate from and en-
courage problem-finding skills.7 2 She also appeared to recognize the
need for problem-finding on an ongoing basis, opining that "[w]ith
greater stability in the markets, we can begin choosing the issues, rather
than having them choose us."7 3
In the same speech, Chairman Schapiro highlighted personnel and
operational reforms instituted by Director Khuzami that also appear to
promote problem-finding:
He removed a layer of management, which will result in the rede-
ployment of dozens of superbly qualified attorneys back to the
front lines, and created specialized units-units where attorneys
can concentrate their expertise in a particular area-such as
structured products or market abuse-and better detect links
and patterns that might not have been spotted before.74
These changes follow on a self-assessment conducted within the SEC Divi-
sion of Enforcement.7 5 Self-assessment, if done properly, incorporates the
70. Davis Serchuk, Is Schapiro Enough for the SEC?, FORBES, Dec. 19, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/18/intelligent-investing-sec-schapiro-madoff-
panelDecl9.html.
71. See Just Don't Mention Bernie, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2009, at A16.
72. See Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Road to
Investor Confidence, Speech Before the SIFMA Annual Conference (Oct. 27,
2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchl02709
mls.htm) [hereinafter Schapiro, Investor Confidence].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Khuzami, AICPA Remarks, supra note 64; see alsoJessica Holzer, SEC's
Khuzami: Enforcement Unit Undergoing 'Self-Assessment,' AccoUNTING & COMPLIANCE
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seven behaviors necessary to effective problem finding.76 Public reports,
however, cast doubt on whether the personnel changes, in particular, re-
flect expert ethnographic problem-finder skills.7 7
B. Success in Organizational Change Follows Recognizable Patterns
Harvard Business School ProfessorJohn Kotter is well known for iden-
tifying a pattern for leading successful organizational change.78 Yet, we
cannot be sure that the President, members of Congress, and key Federal
Reserve, Department of the Treasury, and SEC personnel (including
Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami) are familiar with this work and
with other similar guidance from change leadership literature. And even
if some or all of the change agents impacting a restructuring of the SEC
are familiar with this work, it is unclear whether any of those change
agents are consciously using this learning and incorporating useful ele-
ments from Kotter's books into the SEC reorganization process. Studies
of organizational change have shed significant light on the elements of a
successful reform effort. Leaders effectuating reform at the SEC do not
have to "reinvent the wheel" as they initiate, manage, and institutionalize
organizational change.
Kotter's model is organized into eight stages designed to address
eight observed mistakes made in efforts for organizational change: "estab-
lishing a sense of urgency"; "creating the guiding coalition"; "developing a
vision and strategy"; "communicating the change vision"; "empowering
broad-based action"; generating short-term wins"; "consolidating gains
and producing more change"; and "anchoring new approaches in the cul-
ture."79 Each stage has identifiable characteristics. This part of the Article
will describe each stage in turn and assess whether the two key change
leaders involved in the SEC reform effort-specifically, Chairman
Schapiro and Director Khuzami-appear to have engaged or be engaging,
whether consciously or unconsciously, the elements of that stage. Progress
has been made in six of the eight stages to date. The seventh and eighth
stages are ongoing as this Article is being written.
INT'L, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.acisecure.com/articles/sec-s-khuzami-
enforcement-unit-undergoing-self-assessment.
76. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
77. See Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Upsets Some as It Tries to Sharpen Teeth; Several
Moves Draw In-House Criticism, WASH. PosT,July 15, 2009, at A13 ("Schapiro and her
enforcement director, Robert Khuzami, have undertaken a series of personnel
changes that employees say are causing turmoil within the enforcement division
and posing a distraction from its work investigating financial crime. Khuzami has
two meetings scheduled today with employees to discuss these moves."). The same
article also notes, however, a renewed sense of pride among employees in the Divi-
sion of Enforcement. See id. ("[H]eightened activity has prompted renewed pride
inside the enforcement division even as personnel changes are fueling disenchant-
ment, employees say.").
78. See generally KorrER, supra note 55 (articulating a framework for successful
organizational change comprised of eight stages).
79. Id. at 21 (summarizing the eight-stage process of creating major change).
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1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency
"Visible crises can be enormously helpful in catching people's atten-
tion and pushing up urgency levels."80 To be sure, the SEC has exper-
ienced visible crises over the past few years. Admissions of significant
failures at the SEC extend back over more than two years' time and cover
multiple areas of SEC operations.8 1 "The natural superiority of the U.S.
model for securities regulation is no longer an article of faith, and the
credibility of the SEC as a financial regulator has never been lower."8 2
[A] lthough the SEC has long been "the crown jewel of the finan-
cial regulatory infrastructure," recent developments have called
that characterization into question. The SEC has been the target
of relentless criticism ranging from claims that it mishandled de-
rivatives regulation, oversight of securities firms, and market risk,
to assertions of delays and blunders and possible industry capture
at the Division of Enforcement. These criticisms followed the
Treasury Department's Blueprint of Financial Regulation-re-
leased in March 2008-that criticized the SEC's approach to reg-
ulation as obsolete and proposed a plan of regulatory
consolidation that would effectively lead to the agency's demise.
Most recently, the revelation that the SEC failed to discover a $50
billion Ponzi scheme at Madoff Investment Securities, despite
having received allegations of wrongdoing for over a decade, sug-
gests fundamental weaknesses in its core enforcement
operations.83
To be successful at organizational change, however, a change leader
must use the crisis to shake up the organization. This requires that the
change leader "remove sources of complacency or minimize their im-
pact"8 4 and take actions that are "bold or even risky."8 5 Kotter uses the
concept of fire in a building as a proxy for crisis in an organization, writing
that "[c]onducting business as usual is very difficult if the building seems
to be on fire."8 6 Interestingly, Chairman Schapiro invoked fire imagery in
comments to reporters as she made changes to SEC operations shortly
80. Id. at 45.
81. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, SEC and FDIC Acknowledge Agencies' Lapses, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 15, 2010, at A18; Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled
Collapse, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 2008, at Al.
82. Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 708.
83. Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785,
785-786 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
84. KorrER, supra note 55, at 42.
85. Id. at 42-43.
86. Id. at 45.
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after taking office.8 7 Moreover, in a recent speech, Chairman Schapiro
noted the rapid pace of change at the SEC over the preceding year:
I know that change is hard because within our agency we have
been engaged in some of the most significant change in decades.
When I arrived at the agency last January, we began a process of
assessing our operations and determined we could do better. We
determined that we needed to change. And that is the path we
have chosen.8 8
Director Khuzami also has noted the need for speed as part of the reform
efforts within the Division of Enforcement at the SEC, noting that "[a]
sense of urgency is critical. Long gaps between conduct and atonement
undermine the deterrent impact of our cases, and result in missed oppor-
tunities to achieve a permanent change in behavior and culture."89
The personnel changes instituted at the SEC may be seen as examples
of sweeping change.9 0 The discomfort and discontent of the SEC staff in
response to the personnel changes may be evidence of the brash nature of
these personnel changes.9 1 Kotter's work predicts this kind of reaction.
He notes that "[bjold moves that reduce complacency tend to increase
conflict and to create anxiety, at least at first."92
2. Creating the Guiding Coalition
Leading change is not a solitary task.
Because major change is so difficult to accomplish, a powerful
force is required to sustain the process. No one individual, not
even a monarch-like CEO, is ever able to develop the right vision,
communicate it to large numbers of people, eliminate all the key
obstacles, generate short-term wins, lead and manage dozens of
change projects, and anchor new approaches deep in the organi-
zation's culture.9 3
87. SeeYounglai, supra note 64 ("I like to tell the staff we are going to act like
our hair is on fire.").
88. Schaprio, Embracing Change, supra note 64.
89. Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement, Remarks Before the New York City
Bar, (Aug. 5, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spchO8O5O9rk.htm) [hereinafter Khuzami, First 100 Days].
90. See supra notes 64-65, 70-77, and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. In recent public remarks,
Chairman Schapiro noted that her overall change efforts have been hard on her
staff. See Schapiro, Embracing Change, supra note 64 ("None of this is easy for a
dedicated staff that was already focused on doing its job in a tumultuous time. Yet,
through it all the staff has embraced the change because we all appreciate the
importance of restoring confidence and protecting investors.").
92. KoTrER, supra note 55, at 43.
93. Id. at 51-52. Business leadership authorJim Collins agrees that successful
change leaders put a guiding coalition into place early in the organizational
change process. SeeJim ComINS, GOOD To GREAT 41 (2001). He writes,
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Instead, what is required is a strong leadership team-a team "with the
right composition and sufficient trust among members."9 4 In terms of
composition, "four key characteristics" are important: "position power"-
the entire group who will be charged with making progress in areas of
needed change, "expertise," "credibility," and "leadership."9 5 Trust is
borne of activities that "create . . . mutual understanding, respect, and
caring."9 6 Trust is important because it can lead to the effective creation
of a "common goal" or "shared objective."9 7
Chairman Schapiro has changed the leadership team at the SEC.98
We must question, however, whether the team has the right characteristics
and the requisite trust. Certainly, the credentials of the SEC Commission-
ers are quite impressive in terms of expertise, credibility, and leadership
skills.9 9 Director Khuzami appears to have all four key guiding coalition
characteristics based on the role he has played to date and published re-
ports. 0 0 Chairman Schapiro has put a premium on attracting to the SEC
people with an expansive set of experiences and skills. 0 1 Moreover, the
published remarks of new leaders in the Division of Enforcement-people
with position power-are impressive in their indication of a collective
change momentum.10 2 New leaders continue to emerge, making the
membership of the guiding coalition unsettled and unclear.
The executives who ignited the transformations from good to great did
not first figure out where to drive the bus and then get people to take it
there. No, they first got the right people on the bus (and the wrong peo-
ple off the bus) and then figured out where to drive it.
Id.
94. Id. at 55.
95. Id. at 57.
96. Id. at 62.
97. Id. at 65.
98. See Schapiro, Embracing Change, supra note 64 ("[W]e brought on new
leadership across the SEC committed to revitalizing and reenergizing the agency,
working collaboratively, and thinking creatively about the tools we have to effect
positive change.").
99. See Current SEC Commissioners (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/
about/commissioner.shtml (providing brief biographies of Commissioners).
100. See Khuzami Will Lead SEC Enforcement, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at C3;
Kara Scannell, Crisis on Wall Street: SEC Expected to Name Khuzami Enforcement Director,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at C3; David Scheer & Jesse Westbrook, SEC Names Ex-
Prosecutor Khuzami to Head Enforcement, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 19, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ag0xTeE.ikGw&refer=home;
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Robert Khuzami Named SEC Director
of Enforcement (Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2009/2009-31.htm.
101. See Madoff Failure Testimony, supra note 41; Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Applying the Lessons, Speech Before the Harvard Uni-
versityJohn F. Kennedy School of Government (Nov. 5, 2009) (transcript available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch110509mls.htm) ("At the SEC,
one of the things I've been trying to do is bring on board more people with non-
traditional skill sets and backgrounds.") [hereinafter Schapiro, Lessons].
102. See Bruce Kapati et al., Staff of U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at
News Conference Announcing New SEC Leaders in Enforcement Division (Jan.
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In general, public information sources are not detailed enough to en-
able a comprehensive assessment of the suitability of the composition of
Chairman Schapiro's guiding coalition. For example, according to Kotter,
"[y]ou need both management and leadership skills on the guiding coali-
tion, and they must work in tandem, teamwork style."103 He offers matri-
ces that illustrate optimal compositions. Publicly available information
does not enable us to determine whether or not the SEC guiding coalition
has the optimal balance of management and leadership skills. Only as the
exact identity of the leadership team emerges and the team takes con-
certed and coordinated action will we be able to evaluate its composition.
As difficult as it is for us to appraise the team's composition, it is more
difficult for us to assess whether the guiding coalition has the required
trust. Although I have not found evidence that ostensible members of the
SEC guiding coalition have engaged in team-building exercises or at-
tended a retreat at which intra-group trust may have been engendered,10 4
the SEC's recent self-assessment' 05 may be a sign that mutual trust is being
promoted throughout the agency. As new people are identified for inclu-
sion on the change leadership team, they will need to be effectively
brought into the "circle of trust."10 6
3. Developing a Vision and Strategy
To achieve successful organizational change, a leader needs to have
both vision and a strategy to implement that vision. "Vision refers to a
picture of the future with some implicit or explicit commentary on why
people should strive to create that future."' 0 7 Vision serves to channel
change in a particular direction and incentivizes and coordinates change
in that direction.1 08
Chairman Schapiro seems to understand this aspect of change leader-
ship, and she also seems to be incorporating it into the SEC's operations.
Her vision for a reformed SEC refocuses the SEC's activities on one of the
key policy underpinnings of the federal securities laws: investor
protection. 0 9
13, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch0l
1310newsconf.htm).
103. KorrER, supra note 55, at 57.
104. See id. at 62-64.
105. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
106. Although this term is widely used, it is perhaps most amusingly associ-
ated in modern memory with Meet the Parents (2000) and Meet the Fockers (2004),
two Universal Pictures comedy films directed byJay Roach. See The Internet Movie
Database, Meet the Parents, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0212338/ (last visited
May 29, 2010); The Internet Movie Database, Meet the Fockers, http://www.imdb.
com/title/tt0290002/ (last visited May 29, 2010).
107. KoTrER, supra note 55, at 68.
108. See id. at 68-69.
109. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Premises for Reforming the Regulation of Securities Of-
ferings: An Essay, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 11, 12 (2000) ("Whether it is the
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[A] nother lesson I have learned is to have a vision about where
you want to take your organization and stick to your principles in
getting there.
Principles are not ideologies. They are different. Maybe it's a
question of degree. Maybe to some it's semantics. But as I see it,
unlike ideologies, principles don't seem to demand a particular
answer to every problem that emerges.
We've seen how strict adherence to ideology played out over the
last decade in the financial arena. "Free market ideology" to-
gether with rapidly changing technology, globalization and many
other accidental causes led too many of us to forget hard-learned
lessons from past crises and abandon basic common sense.
Principles, on the other hand, help frame a question, an issue or
a problem. Having a principle might highlight tensions and
tradeoffs of particular choices, but rarely do they force you to
choose between a good solution and a worldview.
For me at the SEC, my main principle is putting investors first.
And, I try to stay focused on that every day. And the goal is to
build an SEC that is deeply expert, nimble, and aggressive-that
gives investors confidence.
In fact, as Bob Glauber can attest, I have a sign posted on my
door that says "How does it help investors?" It's a simple ques-
tion, but it guides all that I do at the SEC. And, all those who
enter my office understand that is the prism through which we
will consider all issues.
It doesn't necessarily dictate the outcome of every issue that
lands on my desk-because there are many solutions to any prob-
lem that could aid investors. But, the principle helps to shape
our thinking and steers us in the right path."1 0
debates within Congress or the frequent expressions of courts, the incantations
regarding the broad objective of the securities laws are the same: to provide full
and fair disclosure for the protection of investors and to enhance the allocational
efficiency of U.S. capital markets.");Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and
Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179, 227 (1991) (noting that
"the overall structure and objectives of the federal securities laws, . .. are aimed
primarily at the protection of investors and the capital markets"); Tamar Frankel,
The Internet, Securities Regulation, and Theory of Law, 73 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 1319, 1324
n.16 (1998) ("Underlying the securities laws are two paramount policies: the policy
of protecting investors, designed to entice investors to put their money at risk in
the markets, and the policy of facilitating capital formation, designed to assist issu-
ers in raising capital."); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of
Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OIo ST. L.J. 1223, 1228
(1998) (referencing "the investor protection and market integrity policy objectives
underlying the federal securities laws").
110. Schapiro, Lessons, supra note 101.
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Vision is implemented through strategy.1 11 "Without vision, strategy
making can be a much more contentious activity.... Even more so, with-
out good vision, a clever strategy or a logical plan can rarely inspire the
kind of action needed to produce major change."' 1 2 Chairman
Schapiro's vision has guided structural and operational change at the SEC
as well as substantive rulemaking. Some credit her clearly conceived vision
and the related rapidly employed strategy for saving the SEC from more
significant structural or operational change.11 3
4. Communicating the Change Vision
According to Kotter, the larger the audience for the change vision,
the more powerful it may be.
A great vision can serve a useful purpose even if it is understood
by just a few key people. But the real power of a vision is un-
leashed only when most of those involved in an enterprise or ac-
tivity have a common understanding of its goals and direction.
That shared sense of a desirable future can help motivate and
coordinate the kinds of actions that create transformations.' 1 4
A leader must be careful to communicate the change vision broadly, fre-
quently (repeatedly), and consistently.1 15 The message conveying the vi-
sion must be direct, clear, simple, and geared to its targeted audiences.116
Metaphors, analogies, examples, and florid prose may be helpful in this
regard.1 17 The means of conveying the message should be varied: oral
and written, large forum and small group, and through words and ac-
tions.118 Finally, to ensure understanding, the communication of the vi-
sion should be a two-way street, involving both give and take as well as
conveying and listening."19
Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami, in particular, have en-
gaged in significant public speaking in which they have regularly and re-
peatedly informed and reminded the SEC staff and various elements of
the public about the SEC's recommitment to investor protection and the
111. See KOTrER, supra note 55, at 75 ("Strategy provided both a logic and a
first level of detail to show how a vision can be accomplished.").
112. Id. at 71.
113. See Taub, supra note 64.
114. KorrER, supra note 55, at 85.
115. See id.; see also id. at 94 ("[E]ffective information transferral almost always
relies on repetition."); id. at 97-99 (extolling the virtues of addressing seeming
inconsistencies).
116. See id. at 89. This is analogous to the "hedgehog concept" described by
business leadership author Jim Collins. See Cou.INS, supra note 93, at 91
("Hedgehogs . . . simplify a complex word into a single organizing idea, a basic
principle or concept that unifies or guides everything.").
117. See id. at 91-92.
118. See id. at 93, 95-97.
119. See id. at 99-100.
6472010]
21
Heminway: Reframing and Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission: L
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
VILIANovA LAW REVIEW
linkage of that vision to structural and operational changes at the SEC. 2 0
These speeches are all transcribed and available on the SEC's Web site.121
Of course, Chairman Schapiro also regularly appears before congressional
committees and subcommittees, and she has communicated her vision in
these arenas as well.1 22 She and Director Khuzami have used memorable
analogies, examples, and words to convey the SEC's organizational change
message.' 2 3 Evidencing an appreciation for two-way communication, soon
after her appointment, Chairman Schapiro took action in response to staff
suggestions that enforcement efforts against corporate violators of the se-
curities laws were too difficult.124 Moreover, the self-assessment process
and related ongoing staff communications are evidence of two-way com-
120. See, e.g., Khuzami, First 100 Days, supra note 89; Robert S. Khuzami, Dir.,
Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at Department of Jus-
tice Press Conference (Nov. 17, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2009/spch111709rsk.htm); Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforce-
ment, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at News Conference Announcing En-
forcement Cooperation Initiative and New Senior Leaders (Jan. 13, 2010)(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch1131Orsk.
htm) [hereinafter Enforcement Cooperation and New Senior Leaders]; Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address to Conference on The
Future of Global Finance (Sept. 18, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/2009/spchO9l8O9mls.htm); Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address to the Practising Law Institute's 41st Annual Insti-
tute on Securities Regulation (Nov. 4, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchl10409mls.htm); Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address to the Society of American Business Editors
and Writers (Apr. 27, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2009/spch042709mls.htm); Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, Building a Stable and Efficient Financial System, Address to the
Investment Company Institute, (May 8, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO5O8O9mls.htm); Schapiro, Embracing Change,
supra note 64; Schapiro, Investor Confidence, supra note 72; Schapiro, Lessons,
supra note 101.
121. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Home Page), http://
www.sec.gov/ (follow "News & Public Statements" hyperlink; then follow
"Speeches and Public Statements" hyperlink).
122. See, e.g., Testimony Before the S. Subcomm. on Financial Servs. and General
Government, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/
ts06O2O9mls.htm.
123. See, e.g., Khuzami, supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing hair
on fire approach); Khuzami, First 100 Days, supra note 89 (providing examples of
key figures' first 100 days in office); Schapiro, Lessons, supra note 101 (analogizing
to favorite professor).
124. See Schapiro, Embracing Change, supra note 64 ("I believe it sent a mes-
sage that our staff has a green light to pursue violations and that we have faith in
their judgment to do so."); Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Address to Practising Law Institute's SEC Speaks in 2009 Program (Feb.
6, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/
spch02O6O9mls.htm) (announcing the plan to streamline the process of seeking
fines against public company violators) [hereinafter Schapiro, SEC Speaks 2009];
see also Marisa McQuilken, SEC Enforcement Lawyers Say Morale Is Up, LEGAL TIMES,
March 2, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=12024287121
12&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
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munication about the structural and operational changes that have been
taking place at the SEC. 12 5 And Chairman Schapiro has continued to ex-
press belief in capturing a variety of viewpoints in decision-making. 126
5. Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action
To implement the leader's vision, employees need to be able to take
action. This may mean clearing away structural barriers, skill deficiencies,
systemic obstacles, and supervisory impediments that may forestall effec-
tive employee participation in change efforts.12 7
Many of the structural and operational reforms implemented by
Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami appear to be designed to em-
power SEC staff members for action that carries forward the change vision
of the SEC. The efforts of Chairman Schapiro to listen and respond to
staff concerns about unnecessary enforcement hurdles are examples of in-
itiatives to streamline structure.128 In addition, the restructuring of the
Division of Enforcement is geared to clear structural barricades to effec-
tive enforcement efforts.' 29 The decision to retain staff with "non-tradi-
tional skills" and the implementation of new staff training are examples of
efforts to remedy skill deficits.130 Human resources and information sys-
tems have been or are being improved in response to deficiencies identi-
fied in the SEC's self-assessment and the OIG's investigation, report, and
recommendations.1 3 In the Division of Enforcement, supervisory posi-
tions are being eliminated, supervisory personnel are being replaced, su-
pervisory responsibilities are being realigned, and supervisory attitudes
that may have impeded investigations are being corrected.' 32
125. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
126. See Schapiro, Lessons, supra note 101.
127. See KorrER, supra note 55, at 102.
128. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
129. See Khuzami, Enforcement Cooperation and New Senior Leaders, supra
note 120 ("Today we are announcing additional steps in our continuing effort to
shape an Enforcement Division that is strong, swift and strategic.").
130. See supra notes 41 and 101 and accompanying text.
131. See Madoff Failure Testimony, supra note 41 ("Enforcement is planning to
implement a new and more rigorous performance evaluation process for staff and
supervisors alike."). "[S]upervisors in the Enforcement division will be required to
review regularly caseload reports generated by the Division's newly enhanced case
management database." Id.; see also id. (describing communication and coordina-
tion initiatives in the OCIE and Division of Enforcement).
132. See id. ("Supervisors at all levels will back up more junior personnel.");
Khuzami, Enforcement Cooperation and New Senior Leaders, supra note 120
(describing structural changes in leadership in the SEC's Division of Enforce-
ment); David Scheer, SEC Said to Reorganize Enforcement Unit, Trim Management
Ranks, BLOOMBERG.COM, July 7, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=20601103&sid=aACDxLXScqEU.
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6. Generating Short-Term Wins
Because the organizational change process is slow and constituents
can be impatient, it is important for a change leader to accomplish certain
limited objectives in the short term.
Major change takes time, sometimes lots of time. Zealous believ-
ers will often stay the course no matter what happens. Most of
the rest of us expect to see convincing evidence that all the effort
is paying off. Nonbelievers have even higher standards of proof.
They want to see clear data indicating that the changes are work-
ing and that the change process isn't absorbing so many re-
sources in the short term as to endanger the organization.1 3 3
To be effective in sustaining organizational change efforts,134 short-term
wins must be "both visible and unambiguous."' 3 5 They also must be
"clearly related to the change effort."1 3 6 And in an effective change effort,
they are planned, not accidental.' 3 7
SEC Chairman Schapiro accomplished some highly publicized early
wins after her appointment was confirmed. In particular, she swiftly
moved to remove perceived barriers to enforcement of the securities laws
against public companies and she appointed Director Khuzami.' 3 8 She
publicly promoted these changes, and they were picked up by the news
media.' 3 9 These efforts generated support in and outside the SEC. 140
Similarly, Director Khuzami scored some early, public wins after his
appointment. In his first 100 days in office, he conducted a self-assess-
ment of the Division of Enforcement, cleaned house in the Division from
a personnel standpoint, and restructured the Division's operations. 4 1
133. KorrER, supra note 55, at 119.
134. See id. at 123 (stating that short-term wins may serve many roles in sup-
porting change efforts). They may "provide evidence that sacrifices are worth it,"
"reward change agents with a pat on the back," "help fine-tune vision and strate-
gies," "undermine cynics and self-serving resistors," "keep bosses on board," and
"build momentum." Id.
135. Id. at 121.
136. Id. at 122.
137. Id. at 124-27.
138. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 124.
140. See Nina Easton, The New Sheriff FORTUNE, Mar. 16, 2009, at 122 (noting
with favor these short-term wins); McQuilken, supra note 124 (noting a prevalent
internal reaction in the Division of Enforcement of the SEC); Rachelle Younglai,
Unshackled, Wall Street's Cop Goes Hard on Fraud, DowJONEs FACrIvA, Aug. 14, 2009("Lawmakers from both political parties are effusive with praise for Schapiro.").
Even SEC gadfly and critic Harry Markopolos expressed support for Chairman
Schapiro's efforts. See Aaron Pressman, Madoff Whistleblower Markapolos Blasts SEC,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 8, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/
content/jun2009/pi2009065_888396.htm?campaign-id=rss-daily ("Amid a hail of
criticism he directed at the agency, the reclusive whistleblower went out of his way
to praise the SEC's new chairwoman, Mary Schapiro.").
141. See Khuzami, First 100 Days, supra note 89.
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More recently, he announced reforms designed to encourage cooperation
with the Division by individuals. 14 2 Most recently, Director Khuzami gave
a speech in which he catalogued these and other changes made in his first
year as Director of the Division of Enforcement, describing the period of
change and increased enforcement as "changing the tires on a moving
car."1 4 3 The key changes made at the Division of Enforcement have gen-
erated favorable commentary. 144
The achievement of these short-term wins on a staggered but consis-
tent basis has kept the SEC's structural and operational reforms in front of
the SEC's staff and the public, building consensus around and momentum
for the SEC's self-initiated reform efforts and distracting attention from
more substantial externally generated suggestions for change.
7. Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change
The long-term time horizon for organizational change not only
makes short-term wins advisable, but also may make early declarations of
victory problematic. It is important that the sense of urgency created by
the change leaders is sustained for the long haul.' 4 5 ' "[S]hort-term wins
are essential to keep momentum going, but the celebration of the wins
can be lethal if urgency is lost. With complacency up, the forces of tradi-
tion can sweep back in with remarkable force and speed."146
Although a rapid, consistent pace of change at the SEC has been sus-
tained over these first fifteen months of reform, Chairman Schapiro and
Director Khuzami, as well as other SEC change leaders, will need to main-
tain the change momentum by continuing to introduce reforms on a regu-
lar basis. Having come this far, the SEC could lose all of the gains it has
made in organizational change merely by relaxing into complacency.
"Until changed practices attain a new equilibrium and have been driven
into the culture, they can be very fragile."' 4 7 To reach that equilibrium, in
addition to engaging in more and continuous change, the SEC should
bring in additional change agents, continue to foster leadership from its
senior managers, recruit and nurture project management and leadership
from lower ranks in the hierarchy, and identify and decrease or eliminate
unnecessary internal structural and operational interconnections that
142. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, SEC Enforcement Division Gets Sweeping Makeover,
COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jan. 20, 2010 (explaining SEC may offer credit to individuals
and corporations that offer testimony, for example, in form of deferred prosecu-
tion agreements and non-prosecution agreements); see also Khuzami, Enforcement
Cooperation and New Senior Leaders, supra note 120.
143. Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Speech to the Society of American Business Editors and Writers (Mar.
19, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch0 3
1910rsk.htm).
144. See Aguilar, supra note 142.
145. See KoTrER, supra note 55, at 131-32.
146. Id. at 132.
147. Id. at 133.
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often make change efforts more complex.' 48 These types of efforts in
change management are difficult and pervasive. 149
8. Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture
Finally, to prevent regression, change leaders must address and re-
solve any incompatibilities between the changes that have been made and
the organization's culture-friction in the group's system of behavioral
norms and shared values.15 0 This is not as easy as it may sound. These
norms and values may apply to the organization as a whole or only to
certain parts of the organization, and it is important to achieve compatibil-
ity on both levels. 15 1 Moreover, culture is change-resistant and nearly in-
visible.15 2 Yet, the failure to address inconsistencies between a change
effort and the prevailing culture can undo years of reform.' 5 3
Accordingly, it is important that Chairman Schapiro and Director
Khuzami understand the applicable behavioral norms and shared values
of the SEC and the Enforcement Division and their respective relevant
cultural sub-groups as they continue to reform the SEC and the Enforce-
ment Division. Because the core vision of investor protection should not
be entirely inconsistent with the SEC's culture (in whole or in pertinent
part), these and other change leaders at the SEC should be able to "graft
the new practices onto the old roots while killing off the inconsistent
pieces." 154 The important thing will be for the SEC's change leaders to
continue to remember the organization's heritage and link it to the organ-
ization's new and ongoing operations and objectives.1 5 5
C. Successful Organizational Change Results from Treating Organizations
as Organic, Living Systems
How a leader engages Kotter's eight stages may be as important as the
fact of engaging them. This observation forces us to consider the nature
of organizations and how they operate in real life. This reality is a com-
plex one because organizations are not unitary entities.
148. See id. at 143.
149. See id. ("Because changing anything of significance in highly interdepen-
dent systems often means changing nearly everything, business transformation can
become a huge exercise that plays itself out over years . . .
150. See id. at 145-48.
151. See id. at 148.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 151.
155. See id. at 151-54. Commissioner Schapiro, in particular, has shown signs
that she understands this part of the change leadership mission-the linkage of
the past to the future. In a November 2009 speech, she talked about restoring the
SEC's reputation "to what it once was-a premier regulatory agency within the
pantheon of regulators" and referenced "reinvigorating the agency, refocusing the
SEC on its core investor-protection mission, and rebuilding investor confidence in
our markets." Schapiro, Lessons, supra note 101.
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An organization is made up of individuals who have and exercise cer-
tain behavioral freedoms-elements of choice-in conducting the work of
the organization.1 56 This individualism may make it difficult for group
members to listen to a change message and collectively follow its man-
dates.15 7 It is important for change leaders to realize that this difficulty
may be less about a failure in communication than about a failure to real-
ize that the organizational change process is faulty because of the leaders'
failure to find a shared change vision-one that has significance for and
has been internalized by everyone-and common change momentum.1 58
People need to be involved in creating the change, not just passively re-
ceiving the change message.15 9
This is because organizations tend to behave more like living systems
than like machines; they are organic.1 60 Change is more likely to be suc-
cessful if leaders acknowledge this tendency and plan their efforts around
four targeted, derivative principles. "These four principles provide very
clear indicators of how, within our organizations, we can work with life's
natural tendency to learn and change." 161 They represent a collective un-
derstanding of the realities of organizational complexity and the interde-
pendence of organizational members.
1. Participation Is Not a Choice
Change leaders and others in the organization are all part of the or-
ganization. The leaders cannot then just pick up a toolbox and fix the
organization and be done with the task. Everyone acts together as part of
a multifaceted whole, so everyone needs to be actively involved in making
organizational change.16 2 This means that it is important for SEC change
leaders not merely to attempt to impose change on the staff and other
personnel, but rather to engage the staff and personnel in the change
process. One important way that Chairman Schapiro has begun to do this
is by rapidly implementing the staffs own suggestions for change. 163 She
also has involved the staff in the change process by enabling them to un-
derstand first-hand her change motivation.16 4 She has expressly acknowl-
156. See Rogers & Wheatley, supra note 8, at 86-87.
157. See id. at 88.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 89 ("In our experience, enormous struggles with implementa-
tion are created every time we deliver changes to the organization rather than figur-
ing out how to involve people in their creation.")
160. See id. at 84-86.
161. Id. at 93.
162. See id. at 88; see also Bolman & Deal, supra note 8, at 8 ("Without support,
training, and chances to participate in the change process, people become a pow-
erful anchor, making forward motion almost impossible.").
163. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
164. See Schapiro, Lessons, supra note 101 (describing Chairman Schapiro's
interaction with SEC staff). In one of her public appearances, Chairman Schapiro
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edged the staffs role in public appearances. 165 Director Khuzami's
engagement with Division of Enforcement employees in making structural
and operational changes in the Division also has been noted.1 6 6
2. Life Always Reacts to Directives; It Never Obeys Them
Communication of the change vision and the strategies or directives
to achieve it will result in individualized reactions from those in the organ-
ization, but not always "straightforward compliance."1 6 7 An effective
change leader will take these varied reactions into account, learn from
them, and use them to advance the two-way communication involved in
the organizational change process.1 6 8 Although only Chairman Schapiro,
Director Khuzami, and their colleagues know what has been communi-
cated and what the various reactions of recipients to those communica-
tions may have been, there are indications in public reports of how these
change leaders might respond to noncompliance or dissent. In a Novem-
ber 2009 speech, Chairman Schapiro noted the value of different perspec-
tives-diverse viewpoints.1 6 9 In addition, press reports document the fact
described her engagements with the SEC staff and employees in the creation of
change at the SEC.
In September, our Inspector General issued a report that outlined many
of the shortcomings that allowed this fraud to go undetected over a num-
ber of years. But, even before his report was issued, we set out to under-
stand where we could improve. And, for the past year, we've been re-
examining and reforming the way we operate.
. . . [B]y the time the Inspector General's report was issued, we had al-
ready had a meaningful head start on the reforms we all agree need to be
undertaken.
But rather than sticking that report in a drawer, I knew we needed to
learn all we could from it. So I sent it to every one of the 3,700 employees
at our agency and encouraged them to read it. And, together with that
report I sent along a sampling of the victims' letters-not just for every-
one to read about the victims' anger and disappointment, but to remind
ourselves about how important it is to do what we do every day-to appre-
ciate the very suffering that our work can prevent.
Id.
165. See, e.g., Schapiro, Embracing Change, supra note 64 ("None of this is
easy for a dedicated staff that was already focused on doing its job in a tumultuous
time. Yet, through it all the staff has embraced the change because we all appreci-
ate the importance of restoring confidence and protecting investors."); Schapiro,
Lessons, supra note 101 ("At the SEC, we have a staff of incredibly talented men
and women."); Schapiro, SEC Speaks 2009, supra note 124 ("I'd like to take a mo-
ment to recognize the many members of the SEC staff who are in attendance to-
day, and thank each and every one of you for your tremendous contributions to
public service and investor protection, during extraordinary times.").
166. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
167. See Rogers & Wheatley, supra note 8, at 90.
168. See id. Two-way communication is an express part of Kotter's fourth
stage of change leadership: communicating the change vision. See supra note 119
and accompanying text.
169. See Schapiro, Lessons, supra note 101.
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that Director Khuzami and employees of the Division of Enforcement en-
gaged in discussion about ongoing strategies and directives to achieve
change in the Division. 170 These examples of inclusive attitudes and ac-
tions show a capacity for the kind of intra-organizational engagement that
comprises successful organizational change efforts.
3. We Do Not See "Reality",- We Each Create Our Own Interpretation of What
Is Real
Just as individuals react to communications in individualized man-
ners, different people interpret situations and events in different ways. 171
These unique and diverse perspectives pose challenges for change leaders
that can only be met through communication between and among the
group members about the divergent perceptions. 172 The desired result?
The birth of "new ways of thinking" and eventual agreement on and sup-
port for a shared response.17 3 The prognosis for success on the part of
Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami in abiding by this principle is
the same as that on the part of these SEC change leaders in abiding by the
preceding principle,17 4 because both principles are built on appreciating
and learning from the rich diversity of responses to stimuli in organiza-
tional settings. In leading change at the SEC, Chairman Schapiro and Di-
rector Khuzami must remain sensitive to the differing perspectives of
others within the agency and encourage a shared discourse and approach.
4. To Create Better Health in a Living System, Connect It to More of Itself
This final principle relates to searching for answers and solutions
from within the organization, as the same may be broadly conceived.
This principle embodies a profound respect for systems. It says
that they are capable of changing themselves, once they are pro-
vided with new and richer information. It says that they have a
natural tendency to move toward better functioning or health. It
assumes that the system already has within it most of the exper-
tise that it needs. This principle also implies that the critical task
for a leader is to increase the number, variety, and strength of
connections within the system. Bringing in remote or ignored
members, providing access across the system, and through those
connections stimulating the creation of new information-all of
these become primary tasks for fostering organizational
change.175
170. See supra note 119.
171. See Rogers & Wheatley, supra note 8, at 91.
172. See id. at 92.
173. See id.
174. See supra notes
175. Rogers & Wheatley, supra note 8, at 93.
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The attitudes, skills, and experiences of Chairman Schapiro and Di-
rector Khuzami noted in describing the first three principles, all of which
involve the engagement of group members in the ongoing process of or-
ganizational change, will serve them well in observing the fourth princi-
ple.17 6 In some respects, this fourth principle may be best seen as a
unifying one-effective change leaders can foster change within the or-
ganization because they will involve everyone in the organization in mak-
ing change, and will engage everyone in the organization in
communication about their individualized responses to the change mes-
sage and their unique interpretations of situations and events. In other
words, the effective change leader treats the organization as a living
organism.
D. In Developing a Strategy for Organizational Change, Success Is More Likely
If Leaders Frame the Issues from a Number of Different Perspectives
Finally, it is significant to note that successful change leaders use a
"comprehensive 'multi-frame' approach"1 77 in determining their strate-
gies for organizational reform, rather than remaining "wedded to one or
two 'frames." 178 A leader who frames questions and answers narrowly is
less likely to fully appreciate how his or her organization works and, there-
fore, is less likely to find success in organizational change efforts.
Leadership gurus Lee Bolman and Terry Deal recommend four
frames that are critical to understanding, supporting, and embedding or-
ganizational change: the "human resources frame," which "focuses on
needs and skills"; the "structural frame," centered on "alignment and clar-
ity"; the "political frame," which spotlights "conflict and arenas"; and the
"symbolic frame," focusing on "meaning and purpose."1 79 The political
and symbolic frames are especially important-and often neglected or
underemphasized.18 0
1. The Human Resources Frame
Leaders who frame the organizational change process from a human
resources perspective understand that successful change relies on the de-
velopment of new knowledge and skills within the organization through
176. See supra notes 161-64, 169-70, 174, and accompanying text.
177. Bolman & Deal, supra note 8, at 7 (articulating four-frame approach to
change initiatives).
178. Id.
179. Id. In summarizing the purpose, emphasis, and impact of the four
frames, Professors Bolman and Deal note that:
[t]he road to change is never easy, no matter how good the intentions or
far-reaching the support. However, if managers and change agents utilize
a well-orchestrated, integrated design that responds to needs for learn-
ing, realignment, negotiation, and grieving, theyjust may find themselves
in the fast lane toward success and improvement.
Id. at 11.
180. See id.
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training.1 8 1 Training not only prepares group members for change but
also makes them more confident in pursuing and embracing change.' 8 2
Happily, the SEC is not ignoring the human resources frame. Staff
training was an early initiative in Chairman Schapiro's change leadership
efforts.18 3 In fact, many of Chairman Schapiro's and Director Khuzami's
public statements focus on this aspect of change at the SEC generally, and
in the Division of Enforcement specifically.18 4
2. The Structural Frame
Organizational structure, as well as knowledge and skills, must sup-
port the organizational change effort.18 5 To minimize "confusion, ambi-
guity, and distrust," "change efforts must anticipate structural issues and
work to realign roles and relationships." 18 6
The SEC also seems to have given attention to the structural frame,
although additional structural changes may be required as the change vi-
sion continues to be implemented. Chairman Schapiro has emphasized
the key role of restructuring in creating positive change.
I am confident that in a few years, we will be able to look back at
an agency that helped to restore investor confidence, that re-
structured key divisions, that changed a formerly insular culture,
that passed rules giving shareholders a better chance to vote for
the directors of the companies they own, that enhanced the
amount of information contained in proxies, that shed light on
the dark spots within our markets, and that closed loopholes that
contributed to the financial crisis.18 7
The Division of Enforcement has already gone through massive structural
changes.' 8 8
3. The Political Frame
"Changing invariably creates conflict"-disputes with winners and
losers.189 Having observed that organizational group members have dif-
ferent responses to change messages and that no two people tend to inter-
pret situations and events in precisely the same way, and that these
181. See id. at 8.
182. See id. at 8-9.
183. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Khuzami, AICPA Remarks, supra note 64; Khuzami, Enforce-
ment Cooperation and New Senior Leaders, supra note 120; Schapiro, Embracing
Change, supra note 64; Schapiro, Lessons, supra note 101.
185. See Bolman & Deal, supra note 8, at 9.
186. Id.
187. Schapiro, Lessons, supra note 101.
188. See supra notes 41, 129, 132, 141, and accompanying text.
189. See Bolman & Deal, supra note 8, at 9.
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differences can be resolved through natural interactions,19 0 we also can
see how conflict borne of change can be resolved through give-and-take
between and among organizational constituents. According to Bolman
and Deal, the key is preventing the conflict from becoming a "street fight"
and instead channeling it into an "arena"-a more organized, supervised
forum.1 91
Unsurprisingly, there is not much public evidence of dissent from
within the SEC to Chairman Schapiro's organizational change efforts.
Personnel reshufflings in the Division of Enforcement appear to have cre-
ated the most conflict, according to media reports.1 92 It is and will be
important for Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami to react to the
inevitable clashes that arise in their organizational change efforts by creat-
ing "processes of negotiation and bargaining where settlements and agree-
ments can be hammered out."193
4. The Symbolic Frame
Finally, a change leader needs to pay attention to symbols as he or she
carries forward his or her change vision. "The meaning of an object or
event can be far more powerful than the reality."194 Symbols create emo-
tional reactions in group members.' 9 5 Accordingly, a change leader must
be aware of symbols that are destroyed or otherwise impacted by his or her
vision or strategies.196 The organization, as a culture, must directly ad-
dress these impacts through "transition rituals"-a process for helping
group members "let go of the past, deal with the pain of the present, and
move into a meaningful future." 9 7
Certainly, by engaging in its reform efforts, the SEC is impacting and
will continue to impact symbols, both negative and positive. For example,
Bernard Madoff has become a symbol of the SEC's incompetence that
both Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami are working hard to de-
stroy. 198 And by changing the nature of leadership positions in the Divi-
sion of Enforcement,1 99 the SEC may be destroying symbols associated
with that former leadership structure. Change leaders at the SEC must be
sensitive to the collateral effects of their vision and strategies on symbols,
190. See supra Parts II.C.2. & 3.
191. See Bolman & Deal, supra note 8, at 9.
192. See supra note 77.
193. Bolman & Deal, supra note 8, at 9.
194. Id. at 10.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 11.
198. See, e.g., Madoff Failure Testimony, supra note 41; Schapiro, Lessons, supra
note 101.
199. See Khuzami, Enforcement Cooperation and New Senior Leaders, supra
note 120.
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and employ appropriate transition rituals to prevent disruptions and dis-
tractions associated with the impact of change on those symbols.
III. CONCLUSION
Organizational change requires thoughtful, informed planning and
execution. Organizations that succeed in achieving lasting change have
certain common characteristics in their change leadership, as evidenced
in change leadership literature. Leaders of successful organizational
change efforts are "wartime leaders" and "problem-finders."2 00 They un-
derstand and effectively employ recognized stages of successful organiza-
tional change. 201 In doing so, they treat the organization as a living
creature2 0 2 and explore and apply change visions and strategies using a
multi-frame analysis. 203 Each of these aspects of successful organizational
change is evidenced in change leadership literature.
While at first blush the SEC may appear to be ill-equipped to engage
in successful organizational change (given recent regulatory failures and
inadequate and inefficient regulatory responses), Chairman Schapiro and
Director Khuzami, as two key SEC leaders, exhibit attributes of successful
change leaders and have begun to follow a path of organizational change
that shows promise for success. That may be conscious; they may be fully
aware of the change leadership literature summarized in this Article. In
that case, this Article merely highlights to others the literature that already
guides their calculated actions. On the other hand, the engagement of
Chairman Schapiro and Director Khuzami with the characteristics and
processes of successful change leadership may be accidental or incidental.
In that event, this Article may be able to better inform and direct their
collective efforts (and those of other change leaders at the SEC) toward
further and more lasting successful organizational change.
200. See supra Part II.A.
201. See supra Part II.B.
202. See supra Part II.C.
203. See supra Part II.D.
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